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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL THRIFT AND 
LOAN COMPANY. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 9837 
]. CLYDE HUNT and 
JESSE L. McCABE, 
Defendants-Appellants 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Merrill A. Faux, Judge 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY THE EFFECT OF 
TITLE 78-37-1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AND THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 
DISMISSING THE ACTION. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON NOV-
EMBER 16, 1962, WAS IMPROPERLY ENTERED 
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AND THAT THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDED IR-
REGULARLY IN ENTERING THEAFOREMENTION-
ED JUDGMENT INASMUCH AS COUNSEL HAD 
STIPULATED THAT THE JUDGMENT \VAS TO BE 
ENTERED ONLY IN THE EVENT THE FUNDS DE-
POSITED TO COURT DID NOT CLEAR. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
DECREED IN THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE 
27th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1962, WERE UNREASON-
ABLE AND CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF THE DES-
CRETION OF THE LOWER COURT. 
POINT IV. 
THAT EVEN IF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AL-
LOWED BY THE LOWER COURT ARE ALLOWED 
TO STAND, THE AMOUNT PAID BY THE DEFEN-
DANT J. CLYDE HUNT ABOVE THAT AMOUNT 
PRAYED FOR IN THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
SHOULD CONSTITUTE A CREDIT TOWARD SAID 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for collection of a sum of $5,038.64, 
plus interest at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum 
from the date of the Complaint, and for attorney's fees in 
the amount of $1,800.00, and costs, on a Promissory Note 
secured by a Chattel Mortgage. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was heard and tried before the Court, sit-
ting without a jury, the Note and Chattel Mortgage were 
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entered in evidence and the Court entered a Judgment 
dated November 16, 1962 and a Judgment dated Novem-
ber 27, 1962 without a determination of indebtedness or 
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property. 
The Defendants appeal from: 
(1) The Judgement entered in favor of the Plain-
tiff on the 16th day of November, 1962. 
(2) The Judgment entered in favor of the Plain-
tiff on the 27th day of November, 1962. 
( 3) The Denial of Lower Court of Motion to Dis-
miss or for new Hearing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON A APPEAL 
Defendants seek to vacate the judgments and a dis-
missal of the action, or in the alternative, a modification 
of the same. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 18, 1961, the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt, co-
signed with Jesse L. McCabe on a Promissary Note in the 
amount of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty and No/ 
100 Dollars ($5,760.00) in favor of Continental Thrift and 
Loan Company, the Plaintiff herein. 
Simultaneously, the Co-Defendant in this action, 
Jesse L. McCabe, signed an automobile chattel mortgage 
on a 1950 Peterbilt six-cylinder Truck-Tractor. Def-
endant J. Clyde Hunt signed the Note as an accomoda-
tion, and did not sign the chattel mortgage. Jesse L. 
McCabe was not served in this action. 
In September, 1962, Defendant J. Clyde Hunt became 
aware of a default in the payments on said Note by Jesse 
L. McCabe. He also became aware that the truck pledged 
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as security on said Note had been abandoned in Phoenix, 
Arizona, and that there were certain charges against said 
security. The Defendant J. Clyde Hunt as a co-signer 
was advised that he was being looked to for payment of 
the Note, and he had one discussion with one of Plaintiff's 
representatives in the office of Mr. Richard Wilkins, Es-
quire. 
On or about the 24th day of September, 1962, the 
Defendant J. Clyde Hunt met with the Plaintiff's Manag-
er in the latter's office, where Defendant J. Clyde Hunt 
arranged to begin payments on the Note beginning Oct-
ober 8, 1962. Defendant J. Clyde Hunt was also to obtain 
and return the secured truck to the State of Utah. In 
order to effect the latter transaction, Defendant J. Clyde 
Hunt was asked to go to the office of Gordon I. Hyde, 
Esquire, Counsel for the Plaintiff, to obtain the necessary 
documents for retrieving the truck. 
In the office of Gordon I. Hyde, Esquire, Gordon I. 
Hyde on the same day demanded a new Note and new 
security, and refused to extend to the Defendant J. Clyde 
Hunt, the papers needed to retreive the security. Counsel 
for the Plaintiff then caused a summons to be served on 
the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt on the 26th day of Septem-
ber, 1962. 
After service of the summons on Defendant J. Clyde 
Hunt, negotiations were initiated for settlement of the 
claim between Counsel. Negotiations were still proceed-
ing when the time would have expired for filing an An-
swer, and Counsel for the Defendant J. Clyd Hunt filed 
an Answer to prevent a Default from being taken. When 
the Answer for filed, Counsel for the Plaintiff withdrew 
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any offer of settlement and advised that he would look to 
Court for his relief. 
The matter came before the Court on the Motion of 
Counsel for the Plaintiff to foreclose the chattel mort-
gage, and upon Motion of Counsel for the Defendant J. 
Clyde Hunt for determination of attorney's fees. 
At the hearing of the Motion, the Defendant J. Clyde 
Hunt tendered to the Court by check the amount of 
$6,000.00 and stipulated in open Court that a judgment 
could be entered in the event the check did not clear the 
Bank. 
Further hearings and testimony were taken, and the 
Court awarded judgment for the Plaintiff, notwithstand-
ing the Stipulation in open Court that judgment would 
not be entered in the event the check of Defendant J. 
Clyde Hunt cleared the Bank. Said judgment was enter-
ed the filed on the 16th day of November, 1962. 
A further judgment was awarded the Plaintiff as 
attorney's fees in the amount of $1,443.10, on the 26th 
day of November, 1962. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY THE EFFECT OF 
TITLE 78-37-1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AND THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 
DISMISSING THE ACTION. 
Title 78, Chapter 37, Section 1, states: 
Form of Action · - Judgment - Special Execu 
tion: 
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There can be but one form of action for recovery 
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secur-
ed by mortgage upon real estate or personal prop-
erty, which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this Chapter. Judgment shall be 
given adjudging the amount due, with costs and 
disbursements, and the sale of the mortgaged pop-
erty, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount 
and accruing costs, and directing the Sheriff to 
proceed and sell the same according to the pro-
visions of the Law relating to sales on execution, 
and a special execution or order of sale shall be 
issued for that purpose. 
In Stewart Livestock Co .. vs. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 
144 Pacific 2nd 276, this Court stated: 
"Section 104-55, 1 and 2 require a mortgagee to 
first exhaust the security before the mortgagee 
can claim the right to levy on any other assets of 
the debtor." 
This is further affirmed by a series of cases decided 
by this Court and reviewed in Zion's Savings Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Rouse, et al, 86 Utah 574, 47 Pacific 2nd 617, 
as follows: 
" In this State there is such a statute, being R. S. 
Utah 1933, 104-55-1, as follows: 'There can be but 
one action for the recovery of any debt or the en-
forcement of any rights secured by mortgage up-
on real estate or personal property, which action 
must be in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter.' 
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The last mentioned statute has been construed by 
this Court in cases which hold there can be but 
one action permitted for the recovery of a debt se-
cured by motgage. Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah 
357, 10 Pacific 481, 11 Pacific 510. That the secur-
ity must be first exhausted as to quantity and val-
ue before other property of the debtor can be re-
sorted to for payment of the debt. Salt Lake Val-
ley Loan & Trust Co. v. Millspaugh, 18 Utah 283, 
54 Pacific 893. That the mortgaged property con-
stitutes a primary fund or thing to which the mort-
gagee must first resort for the dicharge of the debt, 
and until this fund has been exhausted, the mort-
gagee has no personal right of action against the 
mortgagor unless the mortgagor consents therto. 
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pacific 
1036. 117, Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 
Pacific 1036. The Courts can impose a personal lia-
bility on the mortgagor only after having ordered 
sale of the property and after sale a deficiency ap-
pears. Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 Pacific 
148. Howe v. Sears, 30 Utah 344, 84 Pacific 1107. 
That it was the legislative intention to withhold 
the right of a mortgagee to a writ of attachment or 
a garnishment in cases where the debt or obliga-
tion for which the action was brought was secured 
by a mortgage on property, until after sale of the 
mortgaged property and the entry. of a deficiency 
judgment. Blue Creek Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Kehrer, 60 Utah 62, 206 Pacific 287. 
From these decisions it would appear that the Plain-
tiff proceeding on a secured debt must proceed according 
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to the Statute and that a failure to so do is a defense and 
bar to judgment unless it is shown that the security has 
become valueless. 
The Montana Court has held in Barth v. Ely, 278 
Pacific 1002: 
"So long as the security has value, the only action 
that will lie on the mortgaged debt is the statutory 
action on foreclosure." 
Further, in Lepper v. Jackson, 57 Pacific 2nd 768, 
The Court states: 
"The obvious purpose of the Court is to compel one 
who has taken security for his debt, to exhaust his 
security before resorting to the general assets of 
the debtor. Such a creditor cannot waive his se-
curity and sue on the debt except by the forebear-
ance of the debtor who may plead the mortgage as 
a bar to Plaintiff's action, and it becomes such a 
bar unless the Plaintiff can thereafter show that 
the security through no fault of his has become 
worthless." 
This we take it to be the Law in jurisdictions where-
in the unified form of action is set forth by statute. In 
the instant case, the Plaintiff did not request in his Com-
plaint that said mortgage he foreclosed, that a determina-
tion be made of indebtedness, that by sale, the proceeds 
of said mortgage be applied to the indebtedness, with a 
prayer for a judgment for any deficiency so found. 
The Defendant in his answer pleads the mortgage 
as a bar to any judgment until a foreclosure and execution 
and sale and application of the proceeds of said sale of 
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this mortgaged property may be obtained. 
The Plaintiff makes the claim that the security has 
become worthless, but it will be noted from the testimony 
adduced at the hearing, that the Plaintiff spent a sum of 
$585.00 for the preservation of such security, and prior 
to initiating this action, Counsel for the Plaintiff refused 
to grant to the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt documents nec-
essary to bring the security back into the State of Utah. 
Under the circumstances it would appear that the Plain-
tiff would be estopped from asserting a lack of value in 
said security. 
As the entry of any judgment in this case is contrary 
to the Law hereinabove set forth, the judgments en-
tered in the instant case on the 16th day of November, 
1962, and the 27th day of November, 1962, are not in ac-
cordance with Law and should be set aside. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON NOV-
EMBER 16, 1962, WAS IMPROPPERL Y ENTERED 
AND THAT THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDED IR-
REGULARLY IN ENTERING THE AFOREMENTION-
ED JUDGMENT INASMUCH AS COUNSEL HAD 
STIPULATED THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS TO BE 
ENTERED ONLY IN THE EVENT THE FUNDS DE-
POSIED TO THE COURT DID NOT CLEAR. 
On the 9th day of November, 1962, appearing in the 
District Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Order Fore-
closure and Defendant's Motion for Determination of 
Attorney's Fees, Counsel for the Defendant J. Clyd Hunt 
appeared in Court and the following took place, as found 
on Page 9 of the record: 
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MR. PACE: Excuse me, Gordon. Your Honor, my 
. . client is in Court this morning and is prepared to 
pay the total amount of this Note, but I would say 
that in view of that fact, probably this motion of 
yours is. unnecessary, Mr. Hyde. We are prepared 
to offer it to Court and tender to Court the total a-
mount of indebtedness due, Your Honor, and we 
would like to have the Court determine the a-
·rnount of the attorney's fees due, and this would 
probably: then be the :only issue before the Court. 
MR. HYDE: We certainly have no objection to be .. 
ing paid, Your Honor. 
COURT: It is always a good idea to take money 
when it is available. 
On Page 12 of the r:~cord, the argument con-
tinues: 
MR. PACE: Your Honor, Mr. Hyde has essentially 
stated the truth. of our position. We are willing to 
pay the principal of the Note plus interest, plus the 
attorney's fees they had to pay in Arizona to pre-
serve· the security. 
MR. HYDE: Your Honor, it would be simpler if 
the Court simply made the order that this be paid, 
and then we could prepare a judgment adding all 
this in. I don't like to keep the Court here at the 
noon hour. 
COURT: Well, it is an accomodation to me under 
some ·circumstances, today to be able to close 
Court at noon, at 12:00 o'clock today. 
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MR. PACE: Your Honor, we have no objection to 
leaving this here, (the check for $6,000.00), and I 
am sure that we can get together with Counsel and 
determine the exect amount due and owing. How-
ever, I would object to a judgment being entered 
against them (Defendant J. Clyde Hunt), when 
it is tendered into Court. This could of course 
hurt their credit and be a problem for Mr. Hunt. 
MR. HYDE: We would stipulate that the judg-
ment could be signed and held and if full payment 
is made, when the check clears and we receive 
payment, why then it would not be filed. It would 
be returned, if that would be agreeable. 
COURT: The case then would be dismissed? 
MR. HYDE: Yes. 
MR. PACE: I have no objection to this, Your 
Honor. 
It will be noted in the above testimony that stipula-
tion was made that a judgment would be filed in the event 
the check did not clear, and payment was not received. 
There is no evidence before the Court that the check did 
not clear, and the Lower Court erred in entering and 
filing a judgment against the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt, 
based on the above referred to stipulation, because the 
conditions under which said judgment would be filed did 
not develop. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
DECREED IN THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE 
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27th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1962, WERE UNREASON-
ABLE AND CONSTITUTE AN .ABUSE OF THE DIS-
CRETION OF THE LOWER COURT. 
In this action, had the Counsel for the Plaintiff pro-
ceeded properly, the action would have been for a mort-
gage foreclosure, and would therefore have been limited 
by Title 78, Chapter 37, Section 9, which reads as follows: 
Attorney's Fees: In all cases of foreclosures, when 
an attorney's fee is claimed by the Plaintiff, the 
amount thereof shall be fixed by the Court, any 
stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding; pro-
vided no other or greater amount shall be allowed 
or decreed than the sum which shall appear by the 
evidence to be actually charged by and to be paid 
to the attorney for the Plaintiff. 
In the evidence submitted before the Lower Court, 
there is no evidence or showing of any type that Counsel 
for the Plaintiff had any agreement whatsoever with his 
client for the payment of attorney's fees. In the absence 
of any evidence to substantiate the same, it would appear 
that the Plaintiff would be barred from receiving any at-
torney's fees whatsoever. It would further appear that 
the Plaintiff, having failed to bring the proper type of 
action, should not ·be allowed to sheild himself from this 
Statute by virtue of his own improper process. 
In the case· of McCormick v. Swem, 36 Utah 7, 102 
Pacific 628, the Utah Court has discussed the implication 
of attorney's fee on Promissary Notes, wherein it stated: 
"It has frequently been held that even where the 
amount has been agreed upon, it is nevertheless 
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subject to control by the Courts, and therefore, 
if it appears to the Court that the amount agreed 
upon is unfair, unjust, or unreasonable under all 
the circumstances, the same as where no amount 
has been agreed upon." 
This doctrine is confirmed in Banks v. Nelson, 38 
Utah 169, 111 Pacific 907. 
In the case of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 
the Court discusses reasonable attorney's fees, stating: 
"By a reasonable fee, no dobt is meant one which 
is reasonable under all the circumstances of each 
case. What is reasonable, therefore, in a large 
measure, at least must depend upon the amount in 
controversy, the labor and responsibility imposed 
upon the attorney in obtaining judgment, as these 
things may have arisen from the issues presented 
and tried. If an attorney is required to do no more 
than to prepare the formal proceedings and de-
cree in a default case, a smaller sum, no doubt, 
would be reasonable, than in a contested case. And 
especially in one where the issues were numerous 
and intricate questions of both fact and Law arose 
and had to be determined. . . " 
In the instant case it will be pointed out that Defen-
dant J. Clyde Hunt attempted to negotiate a settlement 
of the case prior to filing the action by Plaintiff's Coun-
sel. That Plaintiff's Counsel filed the action immediate-
ly after having his last conversation with the Defendant 
J. Clyde Hunt. The record further shows that while De-
fendant's Counsel was attempting to negotiate a settle-
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ment of the case and filed an Answer to prevent a default 
being taken, Counsel for the Plaintiff withdrew any offer 
of settlement and indicated that he would rely upon the 
Court for his relief. It may further be noted that at the 
first appearance in Court, the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt 
made a tender of the entire amount of indebtedness, plus 
the attorney's fees which were paid in the State of Ariz-
ona for preservation of the security and other costs. In 
view of the prompt payment by the Defendant J. Clyde 
Hunt, it would appear that the attorney's fees awarded 
by the Court in the judgment of November 27th, 1962, 
are excessive in the extreme for the amount of time spent 
and the pleadings prepared in this case. It will be noted 
that the testimony sets forth that Counsel for the Plaintiff 
dedicated one and one-tenth hours (1 1/10) to this case. 
There is no further testimony as to the amount of time 
dedicated by Plaintiff's Counsel. 
It is contended that under the circumstances, the at-
torney's fees set by the Court are not reasonable and con-
stitute an abuse of the discretion of the Lower Court. 
POINT IV. 
THAT EVEN IF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AL-
LOWED BY THE LOWER COURT ARE ALLOWED 
TO STAND, THE AMOUNT PAID BY THE DEFEN-
DANT J. CLYDE HUNT ABOVE THAT AMOUNT 
PRAYED FOR IN THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
SHOULD CONSTITUTE A CREDIT TOWARD SAID 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
As was repeatedly mentioned in the testimony pre-
sented before the Lower Court, the Defendant J. Clyde 
Hunt did not sign, nor was he a party to the Mortgage 
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Agreement of the Defendant Jesse L. McCabe and the 
Plaintiff. Consequently, any expenses incurred by the 
Plaintiff in the preservation of the security are not bind-
ing upon the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt. It will be noted 
from the judgment filed on November 16th, 1962, that 
the total amount of $741.00 was spent by the Defendant 
J. Clyde Hunt either in paying bills on the security in 
Arizona or in paying this amount into the Court. This 
amount of $741.00 cannot in any way legally be assessed 
to J. Clyde Hunt, and the same should constitute a credit 
and an offset against the attorney's fees assessed by the 
Court in the judgment of November 27th, 1962. 
As the Court has no jurisdiction to award to the 
Plaintiff a judgment in excess of the amount prayed for. 
The prayer was for $5,038.64 and the judgment of Novem-
ber 16th, 1962, was for $5,890.54. Excluding interest and 
costs of the action, this is $735.00 more than the amount 
prayed for in the Plaintiff's Complaint. A further ob-
servation is made that the Plaintiff's complains. of and 
requests in his Complaint, the sum of $5,038.64, plus at-
torney's fees. The record will show that the sum of 
$6,000.00 was paid into Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, the judgments of November 16th, 1962, 
and the November 27th, 1962, should be set asside, and 
the cause remanded to the Lower Court for an order re-
turning to the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt all sums of money 
which have been remitted to the Plaintiff in excess of the 
amount of indebtedness prayed for in Plaintiff's Com-
plaint, and pursuant to the Promissory Note signed by 
the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN N. PACE 
19 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
